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John Ruskin: 
the Aesthete as Oracle
Alan Axelrod
I intend to explain my title, but not before 
the conclusion of this essay since the title 
occured to me only after I had read Storm Cloud of 
the Nineteenth Century, which, with the autobio­
graphical Praeterita, concludes; the Ruskin canon. 
Had I stopped reading earlier, through the later 
volumes of Modem Painters, say, or even into the 
more overtly "social" works, my title and subject 
might have been something like "The Development of 
Social Consciousness in a Victorian Aesthete."
The protagonist of Tennyson's "Palace of Art" 
might have served as a convenient model to parallel
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what would have appeared the attenuation in the 
maturing Ruskin of an initially lush and apparent­
ly self-indulgent aesthetic!sm toward ends more 
conscious of social responsibilities. But as one 
progresses through the canon it becomes increas­
ingly clear that "aesthete” is not so much an 
incorrect description of Ruskin at any stage in 
his career, as it is a wholly unmeaning one, 
because through the body of his work there can 
finally be no distinction made between an 
"aesthetic" and a "natural," or "social," universe.
Ihe famous statement in Modem Painters —
"that the greatest thing a human soul ever does
in this world is to see something, and tell what
it saw in a plain way"'*' —  so striking a foreshadbw
of Joseph Conrad in his preface to The Nigger of
2the "Narcissus" —  would seem the credo of a 
somewhat arrogantly sensual aesthete: "To see 
clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion —  all 
in one."
To see, yes; but "to see clearly," we find, 
entails for Ruskin something more than the simple 
perception and communication of sensual phenomena. 
In The Stones of Venice ("The Nature of Gothic") 
Ruskin chides us for merely seeing the artifacts 
of a culture, rather than "reading" them:
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The idea of reading a building as we 
would read Milton or Dante, and getting 
the same kind of delight out of the 
stones as out of the stanzas, never
3enters our minds for a moment.
This notion is also earlier adumbrated in "The 
Nature of Gothic" when Ruskin speaks of "certain 
mental tendencies of the builders" expressed
4"legibly" in what they build, or when Gothic 
architecture is seen as an "index" by which5"religious principle" may be measured, or when 
Ruskin tells us that "read rightly" perfection of 
workmanship may be a sign of the workman's g
slavery . An even more direct expression of this 
vocation of "reading" artifacts is found in Fors 
Clavigera. In what strikes me as a kind of 
ccranentary on his "credo" in Modem Painters, 
Ruskin explains that he has dedicated his life to 
the observation of both nature and noble art so 
that "I might bring others to see what I rejoiced7m, and understand what I had deciphered."
This metaphor (though we shall presently find 
"metaphor" an inadequate —  unmeaning —  descrip­
tion) of "reading" one's surroundings might be 
traced in part to the Calvinist influence Ruskin, 
in Praeterita, tells us his mother brought to his
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childhood. More to the point, however, are the 
affinities with the romantics suggested by this 
mode of perception and pararoountly with Wordsworth, 
For, in The Prelude, in Book V, which Wordsworth so 
significantly titles "Books," the poet tells of 
looking upon the "speaking face of earth and heaven" 
as the book of God, reading thereupon "the 
sovereign Intellect," that manifestation in sensual 
nature of the super-sensual spirit of God.
However, at least two important differences 
between Wordsworth’s and Ruskin’s "reading" must be 
noted, the first of which is perhaps the more 
eminently Victorian. Where Wordsworth reads nature 
as the book of God, Ruskin, at least in the bulk of 
his work, does not read nature directly so much as 
he reads the mediation culture effects upon nature 
through art and architecture. He reads, that is, 
paintings and buildings as "books" Man writes from 
nature. Now because these "books" are the record 
of what men have chosen to learn from nature, the 
study of these artifacts is really the study of 
choice, which Milton defined interchangeably with 
the moral faculty of Reason and which we can call 
simply morality. Ruskin can therefore indulge 
what one comes readily enough to see as a 
peculiarly Victorian penchant, the tendency to
IOWA JOURNAL OF LITERARY STUDIES -  51
moralize all aspects of life, but, what is more, he 
can do so without succumbing to merely esnpty conven­
tion. For, when one sees art and architecture as 
the evidences of choices made among modes of media- 
ting nature, it becomes possible and even imperative 
to assert, as Ruskin does in "Traffic," that "Tasteg. . .is the ONLY morality," or to call a chapter of 
Modem Painters "The Moral of Landscapes."
The second point in which Ruskin differs from 
Wordsworth is that Ruskin!s ''reading" is so 
eminently literal, having the air of the close 
analysis of an actual text, while, with Wordsworth 
"reading" remains finally more a metaphoric sugges­
tion of a spiritual and poetic inspiration drawn 
frcm physical, though symbolic, nature. The 
collocation, in the pages of Modem Painters, of 
Ruskin's brand of "naturalism" —  his doctrine of 
truth, of the necessity of the artist's unflinching 
faithfulness to both the agreeable and less agree­
able aspects of his subject —  and of his definition 
of poetic truth as truth of the greatest precision, 
may be seen as the interpretation of romantic doc­
trine on a level so literal that what was for the 
romantics primarily a poetics becomes for Ruskin a 
viable and more soul-satisfying rival to the 
analysis of nature undertaken by Victorian science.
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Though Wordsworth, too, may have intended to oppose 
an intuitive or inspirational knowledge of nature 
to a Newtonian science, that science perhaps 
represented less of a threat to a poetic "reader" 
of nature than Victorian science was to represent 
to such "readers" of a later age. Whatever threat 
Newton's science may have posed, the very fact that 
it is mathematical, theoretical rather than empiri­
cal, exalts Reason and thereby Wordsworth's hero, 
the mind of man. The empirical tendency of Darwin's 
science, however, puts man on a continuum with 
other creatures and other phenomena while, para­
doxically, severing his mind from that continuum as 
well as from himself. I shall touch upon the 
ramifications this has for the validity of sensual 
perception when I take up Fors Clavigera shortly.
These differences frcm Wordsworth, however, 
serve finally to underscore Ruskin's development of 
rcmantic ideas. The literal quality I spoke of is, 
along the lines of Carlyle's idea of Symbols, a 
paradoxical affirmation of the metaphoric quality 
of the most extreme romanticism. Carlyle had 
seized upon and even intensified the romantic —  
particularly the German rcmantic —  tendency to 
confound metaphoric, which (speaking now as a 
philistine) are merely "figurative," relationships
IOWA JOURNAL OF LITERARY STUDIES — 53
with social or natural —  "literal" —  relationships. 
A hut, Carlyle tells us, is the work of a man, and 
therefore, quite literally the symbol of the man 
whose work it is —  even as the man himself is a 
symbol of the God who created him. If we want to 
carry this translucence of the literal in the 
figurative as far as Carlyle dares us to carry it, 
we might observe that the hut is a metonymy for 
man who is a metonymy for God and, furthermore, that 
this relationship is not merely rhetorical, but, in 
the universe of symbols, quite literal or natural. 
For Ruskin, the hut becomes a cathedral or, as in 
"Traffic," a mercantile exchange, highly ccmplex 
symbols that will yield their meaning only to a 
subtle and intensely literal reading. As with 
Carlyle, this literalness represents an extra­
ordinary leap of faith into the metaphoric, which 
a Wordsworth, really, can only adumbrate. No, only 
the most extreme romantics —  Novalis, for example, 
with his notion of the world-as-poem —  can make 
the leap without reservation. That Ruskin makes it, 
collapsing the metaphoric into the literal, 
necessitates that for him there can be no"aesthetic" 
or ideational world separate frcm a social or natu­
ral or sensual world; and, so, I reiterate: the 
label "aesthete" applied to Ruskin is unmeaning.
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But it is equally unmeaning to call him a social 
thinker or cultural critic. Perhaps, provisionally, 
before we can finally call him an oracle, we had 
better consider him a poet, and one who is indeed 
most poetic not when he is concerned with poetry or 
art, but when he addresses himself most literally to 
social issues.
To pursue this paradox, then, we observe that 
by the time Ruskin has come to write Fors Clavigera 
it would appear that he has lost patience with the 
special "seeing" of Modem Painters and has forth­
rightly entered society, not as mere seer, or even 
thinker, but as actor. Yet in opposing in Fors his 
poetic view of man and nature to a science rather 
too redolent of formaldehyde, he shows that the 
foundation of his social theory remains a concern 
with man's role as the "reader" of what surrounds 
him. First Kant, whose disciples Ruskin high­
handedly disposes of in his opening remarks on the 
"pathetic fallacy" in the third volume of Modem 
Painters, and then nineteenth-century science 
challenged the validity of human perception. Kant, 
as Ruskin gives us to understand him, would have 
us see what we call the world as the mere coinage 
of our brains while the real world, meanwhile and 
always, is severed from us and perpetually unknow­
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able. Victorian science attempts to overcome the 
handicap of the senses by abstracting realities 
beyond the senses and evolving a technology 
commensurate not with sensation but with abstraction. 
It is with Victorian science and technology that the 
world Henry Adams describes, the super-sensual 
world of the dynamo that has defeated the sensual 
world of the Virgin, begins in earnest. So "modem 
Science," we are told in Fors, "declares there is no
9such thing as a Flower," but merely what we are 
accustomed to call a flower, the subjective impres­
sion we draw from a particular arrangement of 
protoplasm. Ruskin opposes this with the aesthetic, 
romantic notion —  almost peevish in its aggressive 
assertion of anthropcmorphicism —  of perception as 
creation of the thing itself: "the world truly 
exists only in the presence of man.""*'0 Then the 
world is, after all, a poem, even as the wild 
Novalis had claimed, and the most apparently 
"social" or "literal" action in this world is neit­
her more nor less real than what we are used to 
calling merely "aesthetic" activity. When Ruskin 
decides late in his career to act in the social 
world no longer by writing and lecturing alone, 
but by creating the League of St. George and the 
fairy-tale utopia associated with it, he is pro­
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jecting a poem in the spirit of the very organicisnv 
which is at once medieval and romantic, that had 
all along been the chief tenet of his aesthetic.
The model farm, the projected schools, even the 
laws are inseparable parts of a whole that is, be­
fore all else, aesthetically satisfying.
I said that Ruskin takes his chief interest in 
mediated nature —  society and culture read through 
their artificts —  rather than in nature directly. 
But in the late series of lectures Storm Cloud of 
the Nineteenth Century Ruskin comes to confront na­
ture directly and with a literalness that is bi­
zarre as it is thoroughgoing, so profound, in fact, 
as to cast him into the role of oracle. Before 
turning to that work, though, I will pursue a brief 
indirection in order to provide the further context 
of a definition of the oracle in my title phrase.
If Tennyson's In Memoriam is the representa­
tive long poem of the Victorian epoch's crisis of 
faith, surely Arnold's "Dover Beach," eloquent 
testimony of the nineteenth-century intellectual's 
loss of "certitude," is the representative shorter 
poem. Yet, frankly, there has always seemed to me 
a gaping flaw in this great poem. That transition, 
via the meditation upon Sophocles, from the literal 
sea that laps the literal shore upon which the
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speaker stands to the metaphoric "Sea of Faith" 
retreating frcm the metaphoric shore of the earth, 
has appeared to me a remarkably lame authorial fiat. 
What, really, can be the basis for such a metaphor, 
the sea having nothing in ccmmon with faith except 
for the word "sea" that Arnold attached to it?
Oddly enough, though, after a survey of Ruskin or 
Carlyle, it is this very lameness that becomes one 
of the most poignant features of the poem because 
it further dramatizes the bifurcation of perception 
and imagination wrought by materialist and positi­
vist philosophies and by the science that was "new" 
in Arnold's time and triumphant in our own. The 
possibility of faith depends upon a kind of nega­
tive capability that so many of the Victorians, 
save Carlyle and Ruskin, had lost or were losing —  
the ability to accept metaphoric as literal truth.
Arnold's poem remains a moving document for us 
even beyond its historical context, of course, 
because there is really nothing extraordinary in 
Arnold's situation. His poem and even its artis­
tic flaw reflect quite effectively Arnold's crisis 
of faith as well as our own. The effect of Storm 
Cloud, on the other hand, is bizarre not so much 
because its vision is apocalyptic, but because it 
is so explicit about the fact of apocalypse. With
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metaphors of the apocalypse we can readily identify, 
but we feel more comfortable (intellectually, I 
mean) if we can attribute a literal belief in such 
an event to religious aberration and mental deteri­
oration —  at least when the person professing that 
belief lacks our own only too literal engines of 
hydrogen apocalypse.
Ruskin begins his first lecture by denying any 
"arriere pensee" —  any ulterior, that is allegori­
cal or metaphorical, intentions —  in the title 
Storm Cloud of the Nineteenth Century. He is true 
to his word: the lecture, accompanied by exquisite 
engravings, is a calm, minutely vivid description 
of "a series of cloud phenomena . . . peculiar to 
our own times . . . yet which have not hitherto 
received any special notice or description from 
meteorologists. Ruskin calls these new clouds 
"plague-clouds," and though he somewhat dernures 
initially, the connection with the divinely judg­
mental plagues of the Old Testament is unavoidable: 
If . . . you ask me for any conceivable 
cause or meaning of these things —  I 
can tell you none, according to your 
modem beliefs; but I can tell you 
what meaning it would have borne to 
the men of old time. Remember, for
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the last twenty years, England, and
all foreign nations, either tempting
her, or following her, have blasphemed
12the name of God. . .
According to our modem beliefs we may, of course, 
be content to confirm the "truth" of Ruskin1s 
observations, and find the cause and meaning of the 
"plague-clouds," by attributing the phenomenon to 
the air pollution of nineteenth-century Coketowns. 
Or perhaps this is a figment —  abetted by those 
polluted Victorian heavens —  of the mental illness 
of Ruskin's later years. But such corroboration or 
explanation frcm our modem selves is irrelevant 
to the Ruskin who, in denying any "arriere pensee," 
has precluded the distinction between possible 
physical causes of the clouds —  that is a job for 
the scientist's modem pseudo-explanations —  and 
the metaphoric perception, the "reading," of them. 
The clouds exist, he says, and because they exist 
he "reads" them to us. Now though the mode of 
perception is fundamentally the same as it was in 
Modem Painters and The Stones of Venice, "reading" 
and telling, Ruskin is no more the aesthete here 
than he ever was in the earlier works; for the 
aesthete must define himself as such by distin­
guishing an aesthetic from a natural or social
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world while Ruskin, on the contrary, defeats that 
distinction, more or less implicitly here in his 
assertion of the Storm Cloud’s absolute literalness 
as a fact.
It is this literalness, a poetry of the matter- 
of-fact, that accounts for the title of this essay. 
If we continue for a moment to grant Ruskin the 
provisional vocation of poet, we must continue to 
specify the kind of poet he is. In his well known 
elucidation of the "pathetic fallacy" Ruskin 
distinguishes four classes of men: those who "feel 
nothing, and therefore see truly" —  so far, that is, 
as the mere sense of sight goes —  those who "feel 
strongly, think weakly, and see untruly" —  these 
constitute the "second order of poets" who conmit 
the "pathetic fallacy" unselfconsciously —  those 
who "feel strongly, think strongly, and see truly 
(first order of poets)" and, finally, those
men who, strong as human creatures can 
be, are yet submitted to influences 
stronger than they, and see in a sort 
untruly, because what they see is 
inconceivably above them. This last
is the usual condition of prophetic
. . . 13 inspiration.
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So X call Ruskin an oracle, who sees in a sort un­
truly because he cannot merely "see" but must "read" 
what he looks upon. As an oracle, he is the apothe­
osis of the faith other Victorians lost; for an 
oracle reads phenomena as if they were runes, his 
faith consisting in the adequacy of what the senses 
tell the imagination, that the "phenomena" and the 
"runes," "literal" and "metaphoric" truth, are 
perfect equivalents.
The necessarily superficial character of this 
survey tends to militate, I think, against any 
sense of development in Ruskin's career. I do not, 
of course,mean to deny that Ruskin developed. He 
himself provides the psychological clue to his 
initial development in the account in Praeterita of 
how the relative sensual deprivation imposed upon 
his childhood by his Calvinist mother resulted in a 
chastened and very much heightened sensibility that
allowed him to perceive lush detail in even the
14most mundane objects.
And surely, after all, the early volumes of Modem 
Painters are more overtly "aesthetic" in orienta­
tion and concern than the later volumes or than 
Ruskin"s later work in general. What I do suggest, 
however, is that the tendency to equate literal with 
metaphoric truth is at all times present in his
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works, and, this being so, the seeds of Storm 
Cloud's "oracle" are present virtually from the 
beginning.
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A Chronology of the Works Discussed
Modem Painters 1843-1860 (Vol. Ill, 1856) 
The Stones of Venice 1851 
The Crown of Wild Olive ("Traffic") 1866 
Fors Clavigera 1871-1884
Storm Cloud of the Nineteenth Century 1884
Praeterita 1885-1889
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Notes
1 Works (Boston and New York: The Colonial Press, 
n.d.), V. 2, pp. 330-1 (Ch. SVI, Sec. 28).
2 Simply to refresh the memory: "My task which I 
am trying to achieve is, by the power of the 
written word to make you hear, to make you feel 
—  it is, before all, to make you see. That —  
and no more, and it is everything."
3 The Stones of Venice (London: J. M. Dent & Co.; 
New York: E. P. Dutton, 1907), V. 2, p. 159 
(Ch. VI, Sec. 28).
4 Ibid., p. 140 (Ch. VI, Sec. 4.).
5 Ibid., p. 144 (Ch. VI, Sec. 9.).
6 Ibid., p. 148 (Ch. VI, Sec. 13.)
7 E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderbum, eds., Works 
(London: George Allen; New York: Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1907), V. 28, p. 648 (Fors Clavigera, 
Letter LXVII, "Canpanionship").
8 The Crown of Wild Olives in Works (New York: The 
Publishers Plate Renting Co., n.d.), V. 7, p. 45 
(Lecture II, "Traffic").
9 Cook and Wedderbum, V. 27, p. 84 (Fors Clavigera 
Letter V, "The White-Thom Blosscm) .
10 Ibid., loc. cit.
11 Ibid., V. 34 (1908), p. 9 (Lecture 1 (Feb 4,
1884), Secs. 1-2).
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12 Ibid., p, 40 (Sec. 38).
13 Works, (Boston and New York: The Colonial Press, 
n.d.), V. 2, p. 208 (Ch. XII, Sec. 9).
14 It is interesting to speculate on possible 
parallels between the childhood of Ruskin and 
that of Jonathan Edwards. One need only examine 
the youthful composition "Of Insects," written 
when Edwards was eleven years old, to appreciate 
the child's keen powers of observation —  very 
probably not unlike those of young Ruskin. In 
this power of observation can be found the seeds 
of Edward's rich and in seme ways even proto­
romantic brand of the Calvinistic allegorization 
of nature, a habit, that is, of "reading" 
reality that may not be all that distant frcm 
Ruskin's.

